The study of social interactions has enriched both the domain of inquiry of economists and the way economists conceptualize individual decision making. The review aims to introduce the classes of models that accommodate estimation of social interactions and to examine the key areas where significant advances have been made in the identification of social effects. It surveys linear and nonlinear models and their applications, including results regarding partial identification. The review also examines conceptual and methodological links with the spatial econometrics and the social networks literatures. It considers empirical applications in the context of our methodological overview.
INTRODUCTION
Within economics, the study of social interactions has expanded the domain of inquiry to incorporate many ideas that are traditionally associated with sociology. Social interactions analysis also extends the methodological individualism of economics in new directions through its focus on the feedbacks between individual behaviors and aggregate outcomes. By social interactions, we refer to interdependences among individuals in which the preferences, beliefs, and constraints faced by one person are directly influenced by the characteristics and choices of others. We emphasize the word directly as these interactions do not occur because of interdependences due to prices, as occurs in an Arrow-Debreu world. In fact, social interactions often represent externalities. Canonical social interactions examples include conformity effects, which occur when the utility from a given behavior increases when others make the same choice, and social networks effects in which information diffuses via direct contacts. Social interactions have been used to help explain phenomena ranging from cigarette smoking to the persistence of ghettos and inner-city poverty. 1 Although social interactions models take sociological ideas seriously, they fully preserve the purposeful, choice-based formulation of individual decision making that is the hallmark of modern economics. These models simply expand the domain of factors that determine individual decisions. Furthermore, it is also no surprise that a precursor to the modern literature is Becker (1974) . Moreover, social interactions models have close parallels in game theory, especially quantal response equilibria (McKelvey & Palfrey 1995) .
Although still relatively new, the social interactions literature is sufficiently large and wide-ranging that a complete survey is beyond the scope of an article of this length (for related surveys in economics, see Manski 2000 , Durlauf 2004 , Ioannides & Loury 2004 . We therefore focus on providing a template for understanding the broader literature. We outline a general theoretical framework for social interactions and then describe the econometric implementation of social interactions ideas, focusing on identification issues. We also describe some links between the social networks and spatial econometrics literatures and social interactions.
Section 2 outlines a general discrete choice model of social interactions that illustrates many of the interesting theoretical properties that social effects have been shown to generate. Section 3 describes the baseline econometric models that have been used in the study of social interactions and focuses on what we call classical identification problems involving the disentanglement of endogenous and exogenous social effects. Some prominent empirical studies are discussed. Section 4 describes contemporary identification problems, which include, in particular, environments with self-selection and unobserved group variables being present. Empirical studies that address these problems, including those that use Social interactions: direct interdependences in preferences, constraints, and beliefs of individuals, which impose a social structure on individual decisions experimental data, are reviewed. Section 5 discusses spatial and network approaches to social interactions. Section 6 concludes.
A DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
A basic model of social interactions, one that captures many of the interesting implications of integrating social factors into individual behavior, can be developed in the context of decisions over a discrete set of choices. We generalize the multinomial choice model of Brock & Durlauf (2002 following Durlauf (1997) and Ioannides (2006) . We model a population of I individuals, each of whom chooses o i among unordered alternatives from the choice set S ¼ {1; . . . ; L}. Each agent i is associated with a group g(i), which is the subset of the population whose behaviors and characteristics enter as direct arguments in i's decision problem. Our goal is to describe the population's behavior in light of these group-level effects.
For i, each choice ',' 2 S, produces utility V i,' , which is the sum of three distinct components. The first is h i,' , private deterministic utility. It is private in that it does not exhibit direct dependence on the choices of others and is deterministic as it is known to the modeler. In econometric work, this is operationalized by assuming h i,' is known up to some set of estimable parameters. The second component is deterministic social utility and captures dependence of the overall utility of a given choice on others' choices. If individual i chooses ' and j chooses s, then i's utility is J i,j,',s . We assume that agents do not observe the choices of others, but rather form beliefs on the choices: p e j;sji denotes the probability i assigns to choice s on the part of j. The social utility components J i; j;';s p e j;sji are additive across j for a given '. A third component is a random individual utility term, e i,' , assumed to be independent across i and '. Therefore, 
This utility function allows for an explicit characterization of the equilibrium choice probabilities once the probability distributions for the random utility terms are specified. We assume that the e i,' 's are distributed according to the multinomial logit model with dispersion parameter B and that expectations are rational (i.e., self-consistency of beliefs). Thus 
Higher B implies lower variance. At one extreme, B ¼ 0 implies all outcomes are equally likely because the private random utility density is so diffused that the maximum of the random utility shocks controls the choice. At the other extreme, B ¼ 1 means that choices are deterministic as the private random utility terms are all equal to zero with probability 1. Under the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, at least one such fixed point exists for each of individual i's choice probabilities, given by Equation 2. It is common in the social interactions literature to simplify the interaction structure by restricting social utility so that an individual only cares about the fraction of the population making the same choice he does. This renders the agent indifferent as to who makes the choices. Under this simplification, the object of interest is not the matrix with elements p i,' , the individual choice probabilities, but rather the aggregate choice probabilities,
where J i,' is the social utility weight i assigns to the share among the population making the choice '. A leading case in the theoretical literature focuses on binary choices with the decision space S ¼ {1,À1}. These models typically treat social utility as a function of the expected choice of others; that is, i's expectation of j's decision is m Recalling the hyperbolic tangent function, tanhðxÞ expðxÞ À expðÀxÞ expðxÞ þ expðÀxÞ ,
, and
To understand the properties of the binary choice model, we consider the case in which all heterogeneity across agents results from random utility; i.e., we assume that h i,' and J i,' are constant across agents. Under our preference assumptions, we can focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which all the expected values are the same. This means that the expected value of the average choice of others will be the overall population mean m:
The properties of this special case are straightforward to describe. If BJ > 1, and h ¼ 0, then the function tanhðBh þ BJmÞ is centered at m ¼ 0, and Equation 5 has three roots: a positive one (upper), m The relationship between the number of equilibria and the parameters J, h, and B can be given some intuition. Holding B constant, it is not surprising that multiple equilibria emerge when the strength of conformity effects, measured by J, is large relative to the strength of private incentives, measured by h. The role of the measure of random utility dispersion B is less obvious. Higher B means lower heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity in turn determines how private and social incentives interact to produce equilibria. With large heterogeneity, then relatively large fractions of the population will experience draws such that either e i;' À e i;' 0 or e i;' 0 À e i;' is large. This means in turn that a relatively high fraction will have their decisions controlled by their idiosyncratic payoffs. But this means that a relatively small percentage of the population remains that can engage in self-consistent bunching because of social utility effects. In other words, if enough agents make choices driven by symmetrically distributed payoff differences, this implicitly delimits the magnitude of the social utility terms because it delimits the possible support of m. Brock & Durlauf (2002 show that these properties extend to the multinomial choice model, when h i;' ¼ h; 8i; '. If BJ L > 1, then at least three equilibria exist, whereas if BJ L < 1, the equilibrium aggregate choice probabilities are unique. The dependence of the threshold for multiplicity on the number of choices L occurs because, when the e i,' 's are independent across i, the probability that the idiosyncratic draw for one of the possible choices dominates the agent's decision is increasing in the number of choices. Similar properties hold for alternative interaction structures. Blume (1993) conceptualizes agents as located on a two-dimensional integer lattice. He assumes that agents interact locally, which amounts to replacing the social utility component in Equation 1 with J P jjÀij¼1 Efo j g. It is straightforward to see that the mean choice level for the population is characterized by Equation 5. This example illustrates a general principle about discrete choice models of social interactions, namely that their qualitative properties are often independent of the specifics of the interaction structure. This property, called universality in the physics literature, helps justify the analysis of particular interaction structures because their properties are not tied to their detailed specification.
Universality provides a segue between social interactions models and statistical mechanics models in physics, in which the property was originally conceptualized. Statistical mechanics models study the macroscopic properties of a large number of interacting objects (e.g., atoms). The Brock-Durlauf model is mathematically equivalent to a variant of the Curie-Weiss model of magnetism, whereas the Blume model is a variant of the Ising model of magnetism. Another example of the application of statistical mechanics models to economics is Topa (2001) , who employs contact processes to study local interactions in unemployment. Despite these examples, we believe the mathematics of statistical mechanics has yet to be fully exploited by economists.
One must be careful in translating statistical mechanics models into social science contexts. One reason is that statistical mechanics models take as primitives the conditional probabilities that relate objects in a system, whereas socioeconomic contexts require that these conditional probabilities derive from individual decision problems. The importance of this distinction is demonstrated by Horst & Scheinkman (2006) . In a social interactions model in which agents are arranged on integer lattices, in which the individual payoff structure is defined in terms of values for J i,j,',s , the authors show that the equilibrium conditional probabilities that relate the choices may have a different pattern of zero and nonzero values, when agents observe one another's choices. Therefore, the conditional probability structure for a given statistical mechanics model does not always reveal the payoff interdependences needed to generate it. Another reason is that exact versus approximate statistical mechanics models can have substantively different interpretations in social science contexts. Brock & Durlauf (2001a) show that the exact solution to the Curie-Weiss model without approximation corresponds to a social planner's problem, whereas the mean field approximation represents an exact (to social scientists) noncooperative model of binary choice.
Discrete choice models do provide a tight connection between theory and econometrics, although this link has not usually been exploited in empirical work. Our canonical social interactions model treats J i,j,',s as a primitive. One can identify models that produce different types of social interactions as equilibrium outcomes (e.g., Bernheim 1994 , Streufert 2000 , Akerlof & Kranton 2002 . This type of work, however, has not been directly integrated into the abstract theoretical structures we outline above.
ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS: CLASSICAL IDENTIFICATION ISSUES
In this section we consider the problem of identifying social interactions in various empirical contexts. This leads to variations of the classical identification problem of simultaneous equations systems that reflect the specific structure of social interactions models. The statistical models allow us to study both the identifiability of a role for some type of social influence on behavior and the identifiability of types of social influences (for estimation issues, see Krauth 2006 , Aradillas-Lopez 2007 , Conley & Topa 2007 , de Paula 2009 .
The distinction between types of social interactions did not arise in our baseline theoretical model of social interactions because effects other than those associated with the J ij 's are subsumed in the private deterministic utility term, as we were considering individuals within a common group. Manski (1993) first emphasized the difficulties of distinguishing types of social interactions and developed an important dichotomy. Endogenous effects capture social interactions that directly occur between one agent's decisions and those of others. An essential feature of this type of interaction is that the choices are simultaneously determined. A canonical example is peer effects in classroom effort; one student works hard based on whether others do so (or are expected to do so). Of course, one can equally well imagine that individuals are affected by the personal characteristics of others. The educational level of the parents of classmates matters if these levels help form the aspirations of the student (and affects students' net utility from effort): These are contextual effects.
In discussing the econometrics of social interactions, we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is independent across agents and unpredictable given individual and group characteristics. We relax these assumptions in the next section.
Our analysis of identification focuses on the two main classes of econometric models: linear-in-means models and discrete choice models. It will be evident that the connections between the linear-in-means models and economic theory are tenuous; Brock & Durlauf (2001c) show that one can reverse engineer a linear-in-means model to represent an agent's optimal behavior. Discrete choice models, of course, provide a tighter link between theory and econometrics, although the empirical literature has typically eschewed fully exploring these links.
Our discussion of identification considers individual observations across groups, g(i). Outcomes for the linear-in-means model are denoted as y i , whereas o i denotes outcomes for discrete choice models; x i denotes individual-level characteristics, and z g(i) denote group-level characteristics.
Linear Models of Social Interactions
The linear-in-means model is a standard regression model:
where m g(i) is the expected average choice in g(i), x i is an r vector of individual effects, z g(i) is an r g vector of contextual effects, and e i is unobserved individual heterogeneity. Applying an expectations operator to both sides of Equation 6 provides an expression for m g(i) in terms of observables that produces a reduced form for y i :
Variants of Equation 6 and especially Equation 7 have been used in many contexts to study social interactions. Datcher (1982) deserves credit for pioneering the empirical approach along the lines of Equation 7. Durlauf (2004) provides an overview of the many studies that have estimated regressions of this type and surveys the kinds of variables that have been purported to represent evidence of social interactions. Prominent examples include the following. Brooks-Gunn et al. (1993) relate IQ and behavioral problems at 36 months of age, high school dropout rates, and nonmarital fertility. Aizer & Currie (2004) and Bertrand et al. (2000) argue that individual use of social services/public assistance is affected by the usage rates of others with whom one interacts, and Weinberg et al. (2004) and Bayer et al. (2008) argue that individual market outcomes are influenced contemporaneously by the labor or market status of neighbors (see also Ioannides & Loury 2004 for a review of the literature). Corcoran et al. (1992) claim that individual labor market outcomes are influenced by growing up in a poor neighborhood, and Burke et al. (2003) contend that physicians' following each others' practices produces geographical variations in medical care practices. Gaviria & Raphael (2001) explore endogenous peer effects in drinking and smoking among teens. An especially interesting example of this type of regression is Mas & Moretti (2009) , who employ a data set that measures supermarket employee productivity in 10-min intervals; their data set is also impressive because the set of peers for a given worker regularly changes due to differences in shift composition and because the spatial orientation of workers in a store is known. This allows for analyses of such questions as whether frequent interactions induce stronger social effects and whether physical proximity to others matters. One topic that has received particular attention concerns the effects of school and classroom peers. For example, Hoxby (2000) examines peer effects in the classroom, and Hanushek et al. (2003) find that growth in academic achievement is associated with the average achievement of school peers. Controlling for peers' achievement, Hoxby & Weingarth (2006) conclude that peers' race, ethnicity, income, and parental education have no or very weak effects, and Henry & Rickman (2007) study peer academic achievement and learning for preschoolers. Lavy et al. (2008) find that the proportion of low-achieving peers has a negative effect on the performance of regular students.
Numerous studies have appeared that have failed to find evidence of social interactions. Among recent studies, Oreopoulos (2003) fails to find evidence that differences in neighborhood quality affect longer-run labor market outcomes, which contrasts with findings such as Corcoran et al. Employing methods similar to Mas & Moretti, Guryan et al. (2007) find little evidence of workplace effects in the context of golf tournaments. We do not attempt to adjudicate the disparate results in the extant literature, which may result from factors ranging from different socioeconomic contexts to different model specifications, but merely observe that, taken at face value, the empirical evidence for social interactions is not decisive.
The regression literature on social interactions suffers from serious measurement problems. One difficulty with empirical studies based on Equation 7 (and, for that matter, its nonlinear analogs we discuss below) is that economic theory does not dictate the appropriate empirical measures of contextual variables that a researcher ought to use. As a result, one finds Bertrand et al. (2000) using the product of welfare usage and own-ethnic group intensity to explain individual welfare usage, whereas Aizer & Currie (2004) use the utilization rate of an individual's language group to measure social effects on public prenatal-care utilization. Similarly, the empirical literature does not typically consider how social variables should interact with individual decisions. If the reason why utilization of social services depends on the usage of others is because of information transmission, as argued by Bertrand et al., then it is unclear why the percentage of users is the appropriate variable, as opposed to some nonlinear transformation, as presumably one only needs one neighbor to provide the information. While considering this type of problem in studying social effects in marriage markets, Drewianka (2003) argues that a higher marriage rate in a community may reduce the propensity of unmarried people to marry as a higher rate hampers search.
Cooley (2009) analyzes this measurement problem from a different vantage point, namely the discrepancy between observable measures and causal ones. She argues that, from the vantage point of theory, causal sources of peer effects between students in a classroom involve two unobservables, endogenous effort and contextual ability, whereas work on classroom peer effects typically uses observable classroom achievement as the measure of outcomes and various ad hoc measures of student characteristics for contextual efforts. Cooley demonstrates that absence of attention to the link between unobserved causal factors and observable proxies can render reduced-form regressions uninterpretable.
A distinct measurement problem arises because theory does not provide guidance as to the appropriate measure of groups. Hence one finds the use of zip codes in Corcoran et al. (1992) and census tracts and blocks in Weinberg et al. (2004) to determine neighborhoods. Akerlof (1997) argues that social interactions are best understood as occurring in a social space that may have many dimensions; this follows naturally when one considers the overlapping effects of factors such as physical proximity, ethnicity, gender, and education on the ways in which individuals interact. Conley & Topa (2002) are unusual in seeking to identify the appropriate axes to situate the actors in social space, finding that ethnicity is of particular importance in defining social interactions for labor market outcomes in Chicago.
The Reflection Problem
A fundamental identification issue for the linear-in-means model arises from the fact that the model is a variant of a simultaneous equations system in which the expected choices of one agent appear as arguments in the equations describing the choices of others. The possibility that this interdependence could cause identification to fail was first recognized in a fundamental paper by Manski (1993) , who dubbed the failure of identification the reflection problem. To understand the problem, assume that the within-group averages of the individual characteristics map one to one to the contextual effects, x g(i) ¼ z g(i) , so that both are r vectors. In this case, the reduced form for outcomes (Equation 7) becomes
In this case, there are 2r þ 1 coefficients corresponding to 2r þ 2 structural parameters. Identification thus fails. In contrast, a necessary condition for identification is that there exists at least one individual characteristic whose group-level average is not a contextual effect, as shown originally in Brock & Durlauf (2001c) ; this corresponds to the classical row condition for identification in simultaneous equations systems. Durlauf & Tanaka (2008) give a sufficient condition for identification, which corresponds to the rank condition in simultaneous equations. These conditions, of course, require prior knowledge on the part of the researcher to produce exclusion restrictions and therefore fall prey to the problem that social interactions models are typically open-ended, 3 which means that the presence of particular group-level determinants of behavior is logically independent of the presence or absence of various individual-level determinants.
Once one moves away from a linear cross-section structure, the reflection problem may not arise, even if there is a one-to-one correspondence between individual and contextual effects. For example, non-linear-in-means variants generically cannot exhibit it. Brock & Durlauf (2001c) show that the reflection problem does not occur for
gðiÞ 6 ¼ 0, relative to the space of twice differentiable functions, outside of nongeneric cases. The intuition is straightforward; the reflection problem requires linear dependence between group outcomes and certain group-level aggregates, which is ruled out by the nonlinearity in Equation 9. Furthermore, the reflection problem does not arise in linear models with dynamic forms of interactions, e.g.,
These examples in which the reflection problem fails to arise should be understood with caution. The reflection problem occurs when there is linear dependence between regressors; multicollinearity can still be a problem in models such as Equations 9 and 10, even if linear independence holds, so that parameter estimates are highly imprecise. Furthermore, the examples given above in which the problem does not arise rely on parametric modeling assumptions. For cross-section data, Manski (1993) provides a nonidentification result for nonparametric contexts that parallels the reflection problem in linear models.
Variance-Based Approaches
The fact that endogenous social interactions help amplify differences in the average group behavior has been used as another route for identification. Glaeser et al. (2003) introduce the concept of a social multiplier to measure this effect. The social multiplier approach can also be useful in delivering a range of estimates for the endogenous social effect when individual data are hard to obtain, as in the case of crime data. Glaeser et al. (1996) motivate their study of crime and social interactions by the extraordinary variation in the incidence of crime across U.S. metropolitan areas over and above differences in fundamentals. They use the idea that the convergence of sample means is slowed down by social interactions as a basis for assessing whether cross-city differences in crime rates are large, once one has controlled for some city-wide characteristics. This approach only requires city-level data. Formally, Glaeser et al. (1996) work with a statistic, the covariance of per-capita outcomes across agents, a measure of social interactions, that is derived as a function of the proportion of agents in a city who are either law-abiders or criminals. This covariance generates overdispersion in cross-city crime rates relative to the absence of social interactions. They show that the estimated index is highest for petty crimes but declines for more serious crimes to become negligible for the most serious ones. Across cities, the implied level of interactions is roughly constant. Because the statistic is related to the expected size of the interacting group of criminals, their results suggest that more serious crimes are associated with smaller group interactions. Glaeser et al. (2003) extend the idea of variance comparisons to formalize the idea of a social multiplier to measure how endogenous social interactions amplify private incentives. They compute the social multiplier by comparing the coefficient vector produced by a within-group regression across individuals,
with the coefficient produced by a regression across group-level averages,
Social multipliers are defined as the ratios of the coefficients in p 0 to their counterparts in p. 4 This approach, of course, requires the existence of at least one individual effect, x i .
The social multiplier approach has also proven useful in uncovering b, even when no individual or contextual effects are present. We return to this approach in the next section. 
Discrete Choice Models of Social Interactions
Discrete choice models of social interactions have been applied to a wide range of contexts, although the model is used more frequently than its linear-in-mean analog. Early examples include Crane (1991) and Evans et al. (1992) on teenage behaviors; more recent examples range from cigarette smoking (Krauth 2005 , Nakajima 2007 ) to medical practices (Burke et al. 2003) . As in the case of linear models, one finds conflicting results in the literature. For example, Crane (focusing on residential neighborhoods) finds strong social effects, whereas Evans et al. (focusing on schools) do not; similarly, Nakajima concludes that peer effects play a larger role in smoking than does Krauth. The econometrics of discrete choice models with social interactions is studied by Brock & Durlauf (2001a . These papers show that the reflection problem does not, under relatively weak assumptions, apply in multinomial choice models when the analyst knows the distribution of the unobserved error terms; the standard assumption in 4 For example, suppose that the true data-generating process is y ig ¼ a 0 þ ax i þ P j6 ¼i y ij þ ig , where a is scalar. Then, one can show that
5 Although the literature on the social multiplier has so far rested on linear models in static settings and emphasizes measuring the strength of social interactions, the concept may be extended to dynamic and nonlinear settings (Brock & Durlauf 2001a) , to complete versus incomplete information (Bisin et al. 2006) , and to more complex interaction topologies (Ioannides 2006). theoretical models that the errors are logit is inessential. Intuitively, identification holds so long as the individual and contextual effects exhibit sufficient variation so as to imply that choice probabilities are nonlinearly related to them. Further, Brock & Durlauf show that for the binary choice case identification holds even if the error distribution is unknown, following Manski (1988) .
A number of variations of our baseline discrete choice model have been studied. Soetevent & Kooreman (2007) use Brock & Durlauf (2001a) as a building block with an inessential conceptual difference. Soetevent & Kooreman's model involves interactions in relatively small groups of given sizes in which choices of other individuals are assumed to be fully observed, and therefore an individual's payoff depends on the actual choice of others in her group, as opposed to expected choices as in Brock & Durlauf. Like Brock & Durlauf, Soetevent & Kooreman focus on pure Nash equilibria with binary outcomes, o i ¼ 1,À1, and estimate the model in effect as a system of simultaneous equations by means of simulation methods. 6 Their empirical application examines the individual behavior of high school teenagers in almost 500 school classes from 70 different schools using data from the National School Youth Survey of the Netherlands. In their baseline model, endogenous social interactions effects are strong for behavior closely related to school (truancy), somewhat weaker for behavior partly related to school (smoking, cell-phone ownership, and moped ownership), and absent for behavior far away from school (asking parents' permission for purchases). Intragender interactions are generally much stronger than cross-gender interactions. When school-specific fixed effects are allowed, social interactions effects are insignificant, with the exception of intragender interactions for truancy. This work is also significant because its simulation-based estimation method allows the authors to account for the potential multiplicity of noncooperative Nash equilibria and the identification problems it poses.
Another interesting variation of the discrete choice model is developed in AradillasLopez (2008 AradillasLopez ( , 2009 , who considers the question of identification of social effects when agents' expectations are not necessarily correct. Aradillas-Lopez (2008) focuses on the empirical implications of social interactions when beliefs are only required to be consistent with the iterated elimination of dominant strategies. Probability bounds are established for social interactions parameters that depend on the number of iterations. Aradillas-Lopez (2009) extends this reasoning to consider environments in which agents' behavior is required to obey a criterion called weakly consistent equilibrium. This imposes that the choices of other agents always lie in the support over which an agent forms beliefs about these behaviors. These approaches provide a link between the social interactions literature and developments in behavioral economics.
In terms of empirical work, the discrete choice model has been extended to consider dynamic contexts and in turn has been applied to duration and optimal stopping problems. Sirakaya (2006) uses a national U.S. sample to identify the risk factors for recidivism among female, male, black, white, and Hispanic felony probationers. She assumes that the individual hazard function for time to recidivism depends on various individual and neighborhood characteristics, as well as social interactions among probationers. Because a probationer is required to live in the jurisdiction that passed the probation sentence, the neighborhood of probationer i, g(i), is assumed to be the jurisdiction. Sirakaya's results 6 With many agents, the two formulations are equivalent, but the finite-agent case raises issues of identification that are common in models of systems of simultaneous outcomes (see Tamer 2003). point to social interactions as one of the most significant factors affecting recidivism within all gender, ethnicity, and race groups, with unobserved neighborhood-level heterogeneity being negligible.
A number of other studies are closely related to Sirakaya's methodological framework. Irwin & Bockstael (2002) argue that the development of adjacent parcels of land in exurbia may confer social benefits, if proximity is desired, but also costs, if congestion and environmental degradation arise; their empirical work finds the second effect is dominant. They estimate net social interactions effects in exurban land-use development that are negative. A second example is Costa & Kahn (2007) , who use a longitudinal data set of Union Army soldiers and a cross-sectional data set of the population of Andersonville to examine the role of social networks in ensuring the survival of Union Army soldiers in captivity. They estimate hazard functions for individual survival probabilities as functions of the number of friends, individual characteristics, and camp conditions and use the cross-sectional data to estimate a probit model of the probability of survival as a function of the number of friends and of demographic characteristics. They find that friends had a statistically significant positive effect on survival probabilities and that the closer the ties were between friends as measured by such identifiers as ethnicity, kinship, and the same hometown, the bigger the impact of friends on survival probabilities was. De Paula (2009) uses the same data and finds evidence of bunching in desertions that is consistent with social interactions. His analysis is based on a sophisticated optimal stopping problem with endogenous social interactions whose econometric properties are carefully examined.
IDENTIFICATION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
In our discussion of social interactions, a best-case assumption on the error structure is assumed, namely that individual unobservables are exchangeable across individuals and groups. Exchangeability in turn is operationalized as independence. Much of modern econometric practice, of course, has developed in a systematic effort to avoid such assumptions (see Heckman 2001) . In this section, we explore the implications of alternative error structures, due to self-selection and group-level unobservables.
Identification of Social Interactions with Self-Selection to Groups and Sorting
For many contexts, economic agents choose their group memberships, and these choices are influenced by social interactions effects. Endogenous group formation naturally affects the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity within groups, which depends on both endogenous and contextual effects, as well as individual specific characteristics, i.e., in Equation 6, Efe i j x i ; z gðiÞ ; m gðiÞ ; i 2 gðiÞg 6 ¼ 0, the standard self-selection problem. Because self-selection into a group means that each member of the group has been influenced by a common set of social factors, this leads to dependence in the conditional expectations across individuals, which Manski (1993) terms correlated effects.
The social interactions literature has followed the broader econometric literature's strategies to address self-selection. A number of studies have employed instrumental variables methods (see Evans et al. 1992 ). Instrumental variable approaches are problematic due to theory open-endedness, which is discussed above. Social interactions models do not naturally generate valid instruments; rather instruments are produced via intuition. This contrasts with contexts such as Euler equation estimation, in which the theory, which implies combinations of forecast errors, itself generates instruments for the analyst.
A second strategy follows the control function approach pioneered by Heckman (1979 , an object that converges to a value proportional to Efe i j x i ; z gðiÞ ; i 2 gðiÞg can be constructed and used as a regressor in Equation 6, now corrected for selection bias:
x i is now uncorrelated with the other regressors. Note that the selection correction term depends on the attributes of all groups in the opportunity set, not only the one that is chosen (see Brock & Durlauf 2001c for further discussion). Equation 14 integrates information about the group selection process into the behavioral equation for outcomes and in a way that provides additional information on social interactions. The additional regressor d Àẑ ;W i;gðiÞ ;W i;ÀgðiÞ Á affects the possibility of the reflection problem's arising. To see why, consider two possibilities. First, suppose that groups are chosen according to the individuals' characteristics x i and the group's characteristics z g(i) . The additional regressor will then take the form d Àẑ ; x i ; z gðiÞ ; z ÀgðiÞ Á , which is an individual specific random variable (its group-level average does not appear in the equation). Second, suppose that groups are chosen according to expected average behavior in the group. In this case d will functionally depend on m g(i) . Because d is almost always a nonlinear function, its introduction transforms the linear-in-means model to a nonlinear one. Both these changes are sufficient to produce identification, even if the model were not identified under random assignment. The ability of self-selection to facilitate identification is not surprising. Group choice naturally contains information about the determinants of the choice. What is perhaps surprising is that randomized group assignment would work to the detriment of identification. Ioannides & Zabel (2008) is the first empirical study to use self-selection to facilitate identification of social interactions. Studying housing demand, Ioannides & Zabel merge the neighborhood cluster subsample with confidential information from the National American Housing Survey. Their estimation of the demand equation for housing structure allows for contextual effects at the level of the immediate neighborhood and at the census tract of residence, and for endogenous social effects, defined as the mean housing demand among immediate neighbors. Their estimation results confirm that the endogenous neighborhood effect is significant and stronger after controlling for the endogeneity of neighborhood choice.
Self-selection also suggests that evidence of social interactions may derive from the prices for group membership. For example, social effects of residential neighborhoods will be reflected in housing prices, via standard hedonic price arguments. Not surprisingly, in view of Brock & Durlauf's (2001c) results on the ability of self-selection to facilitate identification, Nesheim (2002) shows that preferences and the technology of social interactions, measured as children's schooling as a function of the mean parental education in the neighborhood and of parental characteristics, may be identified. Ioannides (2008) shows how certain functional forms produce a closed-form solution for the neighborhood hedonic price in terms of the mean parental education, which should facilitate empirical implementation.
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A related strategy for integrating group choice with social interactions involves estimation of equilibrium models of neighborhood formation in which social interactions play a role in locational decisions. Bayer et al. (2007) employ a discrete choice model to estimate preferences over neighborhood composition with respect to housing choices. Calabrese et al. (2006) estimate a sophisticated structural model that explicitly addresses the political economy of local educational expenditure in which neighborhood composition is shown to affect neighborhood choice.
One general feature of the various approaches to sorting and social interactions is that they assume that once groups are formed, agents in a common group experience similar interactions. Weinberg (2007) makes an original argument that interactions may occur at a lower level of aggregation than the level at which groups are formed. For example, within a classroom, friendships may occur among students with similar characteristics. Weinberg provides empirical evidence that this type of phenomena occurs. He further makes the argument that the capacity of intragroup sorting into subgroups will depend on group size, as larger groups will have more opportunities for individuals to find similar types with which to form bonds. Social interactions in social networks, which we discuss further below, carry this notion further.
Group-Level Unobservables
The second basic problem facing econometric analyses of social interactions is the presence of unobserved group effects. In a classroom, for example, differences in teacher quality will simultaneously affect all students in a classroom. From the perspective of our basic social interactions models, these may be understood as replacing the initial error assumptions in Equation 6 with a g(i) þ e i , where a g(i) is a common group-specific shock. Of course, one can imagine more elaborate changes in the error structure; these have not been much studied.
In our view, unobserved group effects represent the most difficult hurdle to the construction of persuasive evidence of social interactions because, unlike self-selection, there is typically no economic reasoning to facilitate modeling the influences. There is thus no natural solution to group effects analogous to the joint modeling of group formation and behaviors within groups. The methods that exist for overcoming their presence are thus essentially statistical.
One approach uses panels to difference out the group effects; Hoxby (2000) is a good example. Intuitively, variation in z g(i) over time induces variation in m g(i) and therefore produces identification in the differenced model. For Hoxby's model, z g(i) is the percentage of a student's own ethnic group in a classroom. Brock & Durlauf (2007) show that this argument generalizes to panels with discrete data, using ideas in Chamberlain (1984) . This justifies the approach taken by Arcidiacono & Nicholson (2005) in evaluating the effects of peers on specialty choice in medical school. Differencing, of course, assumes that a g(i) is itself not time varying. Furthermore, the approach treats the individual fixed effects as nuisance parameters. Arcidiacono et al. (2007) consider a linear model in which the spillover effects operate through the fixed effects of a student's peers, making fixed effects for one agent influence other agents. They provide conditions under which these effects can be exploited in a panel to facilitate identification of social interactions.
Differencing becomes problematic for models with nonadditive error structures. Cooley (2008) shows how social interactions may be identified for a class of models with nonadditive group effects, exploiting results in Imbens & Newey (2009) . Cooley applies the strategy to school data in North Carolina, finding strong evidence of intraethnic group social interactions in achievement. Cooley's approach does require the use of instrumental variables, which, of course, constitutes a second general strategy for dealing with unobserved group effects, albeit one that we argue above can be hard to justify because of theory open-endedness. Given that unobserved group effects are undertheorized, openendedness is especially hard to overcome for this case. However, as the careful discussion in Cooley shows, it is not impossible given a specific context.
4.2.1.
Variance-based approaches to uncovering social interactions with unobserved group effects. An alternative strategy for uncovering social interactions in the presence of unobserved group effects is based on the variance-covariance structure of outcomes. Graham (2008) extends earlier variance comparisons such as Glaeser et al. (1996) , who do not allow for unobserved group effects. Following Graham, we rule out individual contextual effects and assume that behaviors depend on the realized rather than expected choice of others, producing the model y i;gðiÞ ¼ k þ b y gðiÞ þ e i;gðiÞ ¼ k þ bm gðiÞ þ b½ y gðiÞ À m gðiÞ þ e i;gðiÞ :
Obviously, relative to Equation 15, no instruments exist for m g(i) . However, Graham shows that identification can still be achieved. He does this by employing an approach that echoes the classical literature on identification in simultaneous equations models, in which the structure of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form system augments identification via exclusion restrictions. The key to Graham's method is the assumption that unobserved group effects are random rather than fixed, which imposes structure on the variance-covariance matrix of outcomes. The random-effects assumption can be unappealing in contexts where groups are endogenously formed. To see how a random-effects assumption on group unobservables facilitates identification, decompose the residuals in Equation 15 the two variables are uncorrelated with each other. Let the variance-covariance matrix of the e i,g(i) 's be V n . These assumptions imply that the variance of average outcomes in groups of size n equals
This expression indicates how the parameters b; s 2 a ; and s 2 can be recovered from sizespecific group variances; e.g., calculating Equation 17 for different n's reveals these parameters. Graham (2008) and Durlauf & Tanaka (2008) discuss ways to modify Graham's baseline assumptions and preserve identification. An especially valuable study is Davezies et al. (2006) , which provides a systematic discussion of the use of the variance-covariance matrix of residuals for the linear-in-means model to facilitate identification; it also provides results for binary choice models. A nice feature of their work is the clarification of when homoskedasticity assumptions are needed.
Graham applies his methods to data from Project STAR, a class-size reduction experiment in Tennessee. In that experiment, kindergarten students and teachers were randomly assigned to large and small classrooms. Random assignment of teachers ensures that the distribution of their characteristics is similar across the two types of classrooms, and Equation 17 may be exploited. Graham (2008) reports differences in peer-group quality that constitute evidence of social interactions.
Variance components and social interactions.
The use of variance information has been exploited in a different way by Solon et al. (2000) . Their analysis focuses on the case in which one cannot observe either family-specific or group-specific effects. Solon et al. propose a variance decomposition of individual outcomes to bound the contribution of group effects. One can formulate their analysis in terms of a variance components model (Searle et al. 2006 ):
where m f denotes a family effect, n n denotes a group effect, o f,n denotes an interactive effect between family and group, and e i,f,n denotes an idiosyncratic effect. Assuming that these components are orthogonal (and such a decomposition always exists), one can calculate the variance contribution of n n to the overall variance of y i,f,n . Solon et al. do not use this decomposition directly; instead they use sibling versus neighbor covariances to bound the variance of n n , finding little evidence that neighborhoods affect education. One limitation of this approach is that it reduces the vector of social interactions to a scalar so that one cannot tell which social factors matter. In fact, it is possible for different social factors to cancel each other out. Another limitation is that the presence of o f,n can make interpretations problematic, although Solon et al. argue that one can assume the term is positive due to sorting across neighborhoods. For these reasons, Oreopoulos (2003) is interesting. This paper uses data from Toronto that allow one to trace the adult labor market outcomes of children who grew up in different public housing projects; these projects differ in terms of neighborhood characteristics such as crime. Random assignment across public housing projects eliminates correlations between individual and neighborhood characteristics that cloud the variance decomposition (Equation 18). That said, Oreopoulos also finds that social interactions fail to play a large role in explaining differences in adult economic outcomes.
Partial identification with nonlinear models.
A final approach to unobserved group effects is due to Brock & Durlauf (2007) , who develop partial identification results for binary choice models under what they argue are weak assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved group effects. This work exploits a fundamental difference between endogenous effects and unobserved group effects: Only endogenous effects can produce multiple equilibria. Hence, if evidence of multiple equilibria can be generated, it represents evidence of endogenous social interactions.
Brock & Durlauf operationalize this idea in several ways. First, they consider the use of pattern reversals in group-level outcomes. A pattern reversal occurs when the rank order of average outcomes between two groups is the reverse of what one would predict given the observed individual and contextual effects for the groups. Brock & Durlauf demonstrate that, under various shape restrictions on the probability density of the unobservables, pattern reversals can only occur because of multiple equilibria and hence endogenous social interactions. For example, if the distribution of unobservables shifts monotonically in observables, then pattern reversals cannot occur without social interactions. A second approach involves the bimodality of linear combinations of contextual effects. Here Brock & Durlauf show that, conditioning on a given average outcome, the cross-section distribution of certain linear combinations of contextual variables must be unimodal. This last result corrects a misconception that multiple equilibria induce multimodality of average outcomes conditional on contextual effects, whereas multiple equilibria do induce a mixture density of outcomes; not all mixtures are multimodal. Brock & Durlauf (2010) extend this perspective to the study of social effects in technology adoption. In this analysis, individuals are motivated to adopt a new technology by both individual observable and unobservable characteristics (which may be correlated across individuals) as well as by the percentage of the population that has adopted, which defines the social interactions effect. They provide conditions under which a higher adoption rate by individuals whose observable fundamentals predict a lower adoption rate than another group can only occur because of social effects. This pattern reversal does not occur because of multiple equilibria but rather because of the potential for social effects to lead agents with different private incentives to bunch and adopt simultaneously. As such, the analysis complements the more structural one of de Paula (2009), as well as a subtle investigation by Young (2009) on the observational differences between learning and conformity models in dynamic environments.
Although partial identification arguments of the Brock-Durlauf type have not been used empirically, one does find analyses that may be interpreted in this way. For example, Card et al. (2008) evaluate Schelling's classic tipping model of segregation by a search for discontinuities in the relationship between changes in neighborhood racial composition and initial racial composition. We conjecture that this achieves partial identification of the effect of neighborhood composition on individual utility so long as one imposes a continuity assumption on the density of unobservables, which is what Brock & Durlauf (2010) call a shape assumption.
For many forms of social interactions, endogenous group formation can produce assortative matching. One intuition follows from the Becker (1973) marriage model and can be generalized in a number of ways (Durlauf & Seshadri 2003) : Social interactions can represent complementarities and mean that stratification is efficient. One example for this is human capital complementarity across workers. In other contexts, such as neighborhoods, social interactions can produce incentives to stratify regardless of whether the stratification is efficient; Becker & Murphy (2000) give a nice exposition of this property for residential neighborhoods. These theoretical results suggest that another strategy for uncovering social interactions could involve the evaluation of degrees of stratification across groups. Although there does exist a literature on the identification of complementarities via stratification patterns (see Siow 2009 for a recent example), this method has yet to be used to uncover social interactions per se. The closest example of this strategy is Card et al. (2008) , discussed above, as it uses changes in the degree of segregation as the basis for inferences. It should be noted that methods for estimating neighborhood choices as exemplified in Epple & Sieg (1999) are explicitly designed to explain the intragroup distributions of characteristics, so our suggestion should be understood as complementary to this structural style of work.
Although we focus on partial identification in social interactions contexts, there is a broader literature on partial identification in games, much of which is driven by multiple equilibrium issues. Tamer (2003) is a seminal contribution.
Experiments
As is true for much of economics, concerns over the assumptions needed to achieve identification with observational data have led to substantial interest in experiments and quasi-experiments as ways to uncover social interactions. The experimental approach has seen little direct work on econometric issues, relying on the existing treatment effect methods to study social interactions. One exception is Hirano & Hahn (2009) , who study design issues for social interactions experiments. Another is Graham et al. (2008) , who formulate measures of changes in group composition on group outcomes that generalize treatment effect calculations to explicitly consider social interactions.
At one end of the scale, interest in the effects of residential neighborhood effects led the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1994 to implement the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. The program provides housing vouchers to a randomly selected group of families from among residents of high-poverty public housing projects. Within this subsidized group, families in turn were randomly allocated between two subgroups: one that received unrestricted vouchers and another that received vouchers that could only be used in census tracts with poverty rates below 10% (these users are termed the experimental group). Members of the experimental group also received relocation counseling.
The data from the MTO program have been used by a number of researchers to evaluate social interactions. Kling et al. (2007) is the state-of-the-art study both in terms of methodology and coverage across all study sites; earlier analyses include Ludwig et al. (2001) and Kling et al. (2005 ). Following Kling et al. (2007 , social interactions are inferred when evidence is found that movement to a low-poverty neighborhood affects socioeconomic outcomes. In doing this, the authors calculate both intent to treat and treatment on the treated effects, corresponding to the effects of receipt of the voucher and use of the voucher, respectively.
In what is the best overview of the MTO program, Kling et al. (2007) find mixed evidence on the effects of movement to lower-poverty communities, even though the housing voucher lottery caused otherwise similar groups of families to reside in very different neighborhoods. For adults, their analysis revealed little evidence that movement to low-poverty neighborhoods affected economic self-sufficiency although some improvements occurred in mental health. In terms of the children, they find beneficial effects for teenage girls with respect to education, risky behavior, and physical health. Alternatively, for teenage boys, relocation to lower-poverty neighborhoods was associated with deterioration of a number of socioeconomic outcomes, in particular with respect to criminal behavior. The evidence that effects of housing vouchers appear to accrue from changes in neighborhood characteristics rather than from moves per se suggests that interventions that substantially improve distressed neighborhoods could have effects at least as large as those observed from moving to lower-poverty neighborhoods.
Although the MTO program is a unique evidence source, there are a number of limitations to the use of existing findings of program effects to either draw policy implications or even to infer the empirical salience of social interactions. One general problem is that only one-quarter of eligible families signed up for MTO, which also suggests that decisions are influenced by unobservables. These statistics also suggest that the respective populations are not representative. In terms of policy, one criticism is due to Sobel (2006) , who argues that different respondents' outcomes are correlated, which is known as interference among respondents. Using the MTO demonstration as a concrete context, Sobel provides a causal framework for policy evaluation when interference is present. He characterizes the properties of the usual estimators of treatment effects, which are unbiased and/or consistent in randomized studies without interference. When interference is present, the difference between a treatment group mean and a control group mean does not estimate an average treatment effect, but rather the difference between two effects defined on two distinct subpopulations. This result means that a researcher who fails to recognize it could infer that a treatment is beneficial when in fact it is not. Kling et al. (2007) reject the argument of interference by pointing to the fact that 55% of household heads who signed up for MTO had no friends and 65% had no family in their baseline neighborhoods. However, to the extent that interference did not occur, then it is unclear how to extrapolate the program to larger policy interventions. In particular, Durlauf (2004) argues that moving large numbers of poor families to more affluent communities will induce general equilibrium effects in terms of the location decisions of other families and the ability of schools in these neighborhoods to provide needed services, for example. One can additionally imagine that the commitment of affluent families to public schools would be strained by a massive influx of poor families into their communities.
In terms of the question of the empirical salience of social interactions, MTO studies suffer from the lack of attention to mapping between treatment parameters and the underlying social interactions. A range of neighborhood characteristics generate social interactions effects; the role model effects of affluent neighbors are quite distinct from the support mechanisms that are generated by proximity to friends and relatives. MTO families who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods did not simply move from worse to better neighborhoods; rather they traded off one vector of neighborhood attributes for another. This also renders the interpretation of positive evidence of voucher effects problematic. One example is discussed by Kling et al. (2007) : the reduction in asthma among children who move to low-poverty neighborhoods. This could result from stress reduction; to the extent this is generated by neighborhood characteristics, this is a social interactions effect. Another reason for lower asthma rates, however, could be reduced exposure to vermin infestations, induced by changes in housing quality, in turn induced by the requirement that the vouchers were used in low-poverty neighborhoods, which is not a social interactions effect.
A second class of experimental studies has been conducted in laboratories, such as Falk & Ichino (2006) . Their experiment involves workers who are assigned in pairs to stuff envelopes, with a control group being provided by subjects working alone in a room. These authors find that standard deviations of output are significantly smaller within pairs than between pairs, and average output per person is greater when subjects work in pairs. They also predict theoretically that peer effects are asymmetric; low-productivity workers are more sensitive to the behavior of high-productivity workers as peers, and they find indirect evidence that this holds. Although the findings of the effects of working in pairs versus working singly are quite clean, they do not reveal why the effects are occurring.
A third class of studies involves natural experiments, in which the assignment of individuals to groups has occurred in a way that facilitates identification of social effects. Sacerdote (2001) exploits the effects of randomly assigned freshman-year room-and dormmates at Dartmouth College. Sacerdote estimates Equation 6 with an individual's grade point average as a dependent variable, as a function of an individual's own academic ability and social habits, and the academic ability and grade point average of roommates, finding that peers have an impact on each others' grade point average and on decisions to join social groups such as fraternities. He does not, however, find residential peer effects in decisions such as choice of college major. Interestingly, peer effects are smaller the more directly a decision is related to labor market activities.
A final class of studies follows the spirit of natural experiments but does not rely on identifying contexts where random assignment holds, but rather on other data features. Young & Burke (2001) use differences in the terms of tenant/landowner agriculture contracts across Illinois to evaluate the importance of social norms on contract terms. They find that contract terms tend to focus on simple crop-sharing rules that cannot be explained by standard contract theory.
Although we emphasize some limitations of experimental studies, this does not imply either that the studies are uninformative or that their utility is lower than observational studies. Rather, we seek to combat the presumption that experimental studies trump observational ones and that randomization should be regarded as the gold standard for empirical work.
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN SOCIAL NETWORKS
Our discussion of empirical work above focuses on social interactions models in which group influences are generated by relatively crude aggregates, normally the average characteristics or behaviors of others. In contrast, social networks models provide a primary focus on the microstructure of interactions emphasizing heterogeneity in these interactions across individual pairs. Jackson (2008) reviews the new theories. Here are examples of social interactions analyses that have been enriched by network thinking.
Models
One reason social networks matter in social interactions analysis is because they facilitate identification by breaking the reflection problem. This was originally recognized in CohenCole (2006) and is systematically explored in Bramoullé et al. (2009) . Using Y to represent the I-column vector of individual actions, we may generalize the linear-in-means model (Equation 6 ) to allow for an arbitrary set of pairwise interactions. In a linear setting (Equation 6 ), this amounts to replacing bm g(i) with bJY. Following Bramoullé et al., we employ the former and further assume that J ik ¼ 1, if i is influenced by k, and J ik ¼ 0, otherwise. In addition, the endogenous effect is defined as bJY. In other words, each pairwise interaction has an endogenous interaction weight b or a weight zero, and every contextual effect has a weight y or zero, depending on whether the agents are directly linked. Recalling that i is a vector of ones, the vector counterpart of Equation 6 is thus
where a and y are r-column vectors of parameters, and X is an I Â r matrix of individual effects. This system of equations retains a single parameter b for the endogenous social effect but allows for heterogeneous interactions among individuals. If jbj < 1, then I À bJ is invertible, and provided that each individual is socially connected with at least one other individual, Equation 19 yields the reduced form: Why does this condition allow for identification? Intuitively, accounting for network structure means that each individual i's behavior is associated with a set EfY gðiÞ g ¼ JEfYg of variables that need to be instrumented. Consider two other agents, j and k, such that J ij ¼ 0 (i and j are not socially connected) is imposed a priori. When J ik ¼ 0 has not been imposed a priori, one can use the individual characteristics for j to instrument for EfY gðkÞ g so long as j does directly affect k. In other words, by setting certain coefficients equal to zero, network structure produces exclusion restrictions that are analogous to the rank and order condition in simultaneous equations analysis.
There exists a close relationship between social interactions and spatial econometrics models that was only recently recognized by researchers. 8 Lee (2007), Lee et al. (2010) , and Lin (2008) estimate a version of the social interactions problem with a network structure, which is specified in terms of groups g ¼ 1; . . . ; G:
where Z is an n g Â r matrix of contextual effects, Y g is the column n g vector of outcomes for each member of group g, n g is the group's size, J g is group g's social weights matrix, i g is a column n g vector of ones, e g is a column n g vector of shocks, and a 0g is a group-specific fixed effect. The network structure in Equation 21 generalizes the standard spatial autocorrelation (SAR) model. The shocks e g 's may have a general variance-covariance matrix. However, the spatial econometrics literature has typically assumed that
where J g,e is a matrix of coefficients that corresponds to network structure in the errors for group g, which may or may not be the same as J g (see Lee et al. 2010) , and R g denotes an n g column of independently and identically distributed shocks, which allows for information from the covariance matrix of errors to assist identification. A comparison of Equation 19 and Equations 21 and 22 indicates how network and spatial models are interrelated. Each assumes prior knowledge of the members of each agent's group. Each assumes that interactions within a group are homogeneous; i.e., the same weight is assigned to each member of the group. The key differences lie in the introduction of an error structure corresponding to the network structure in the spatial econometrics case.
Empirics of Social Interactions in Social Networks
As emphasized above, network models require prior knowledge of the network structure. Relatively few data sets have this feature. For this reason, economists have been especially interested in the Add Health data set. Add Health, the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth), is a U.S.-based study designed to facilitate exploration of the causes of health-related behaviors of adolescents in grades 7 through 12, the structure of adolescent friendship networks, and individual outcomes in young adulthood. It seeks to examine how social contexts (families, friends, peers, schools, neighborhoods, and communities) influence adolescents' health and risk-taking behaviors. It has become a major resource for social networks analysis. In the remainder of this section we describe some examples of interesting studies using this data set. Fryer & Torelli (2006) use academic achievement as a definition of "acting white" by nonwhite students to examine its relationship to popularity. They measure popularity in terms of a network-specific spectral popularity measure, which identifies popularity of the members of a group with a measure of the intensity of the social connections among the members of that group. Specifically, this study can be seen as a simplified version of Equation 19 , in which, instead of the full system of simultaneous equations, achievement as an outcome is related to a popularity statistic based on J in Equation 19 . They demonstrate that there are large racial differences in the relationship between popularity and academic achievement. Calvó -Armengol et al. (2009) estimate individual school performance as a function of the topology of their friendship networks, defined as embedded in different schools, while controlling for individual characteristics, such as family background controls, residential group variables, contextual effects, and network component fixed effects. Specifically, they estimate Equation 21 imposing b ¼ 0 and assuming a given adjacency matrix for the social network J, that is, J i,j ¼ 1, if agents i and J are directly connected, and J i,j ¼ 0, otherwise. The error structure consists of network component-specific fixed effects plus a vector of shocks e that satisfy
where J g is the group g-specific adjacency matrix, and N g is a vector whose i element is the number of direct links for each person in group g(i). Because the error structure represents individual outcomes that are not explained for by individual characteristics, X, and contextual effects, JX, it proxies for correlated effects and peer effects. Their estimation of the stochastic structure of Equation 21 with Equation 23 thus subsumes endogenous social effects into the estimation of (a, f) above. Their results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in their centrality index translates into approximately 7% of a standard deviation in education outcomes. Interestingly, these authors' estimates of the effect on a school performance index of the number of each individual's friends and of the peer effect, (a, f), change little if social interactions are allowed to be directional.
CONCLUSIONS
Scholarly interest in social interactions has rapidly expanded in many areas of economics and has led to numerous methodological and empirical advances. For theorists, key challenges include the development of analytically tractable frameworks that allow for the analysis for social interactions contexts in ways that accommodate increasingly rich forms of intertemporal as well as cross-section heterogeneity.
In parallel, we see a need for a more constructive role for computer simulations when analytical tractability is impossible. For theorists as well as econometricians, a primary challenge is the complete integration of the measurement of social interactions with the joint processes of group formation and subsequent behaviors within groups. The social interactions literature has paid inadequate attention to markets both in the sense of modeling the mechanisms by which groups are formed and in understanding how social influences manifest themselves in equilibria. For example, socially determined effort in a firm is manifested in wages.
Social forces, whether manifested through neighborhoods, schools, communities, or firms, impact much of what constitutes modern economic life. We therefore conjecture that social interactions become an increasingly important area of research.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. The integration of social interactions into theoretical economic models deserves attention. 2. The identification of social interactions relies on features of different types of data. 3. Relationships between social interactions models and spatial and network models have only recently attracted serious scholarly attention.
FUTURE ISSUES
1. The integration of richer interactions structures into social interactions models will benefit from endogenizing links. 2. The integration of endogenous network formation and the identification of social interactions deserve attention in future research. Pioneering empirical paper in the effort to measure social interactions effects.
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